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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The present action asks this Court to confirm that a signatory to an arbitration agreement

cannot compel non-signatories to arbitrate disputes against their will unless there is a basis under
ordinary principles of agency or contract law for doing so. Appellant Mark Boling ("Boling")
filed a demand for arbitration against Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, an entity with whom
he had an agreement containing an arbitration clause. Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC is not
a party to the present litigation because it is a party to the agreement containing the arbitration
clause. In his demand for arbitration, however, Boling also named all counter-defenda..11ts, none
of whom are parties to the agreement between Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC and Boling.
While any of the counter-defendants could have voluntarily consented to join in the
arbitration, each of them elected to exercise their right to defend themselves in a traditional
judicial forum. None of them have ever undertaken any actions that would constitute a waiver of
that right and Boling cannot establish, under ordinary principals of agency or contract law, that
they should be compelled to arbitration against their will. Because the non-signatories have the
right to litigate Boling' s claims against them in the judicial forum, the district court correctly
stayed the arbitration. The counter-defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the
district court's order.

B.

Concise Statement of the Factual and Procedural History
The facts relevant to the present appeal are largely undisputed. Boling entered into a

subscription agreement with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC. R. 000009-000015. The
subscription agreement contained an arbitration clause. R. 000012. The subscription agreement
was signed by Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, by and through its manager, Clearwater
REI, LLC, by and through its manager, Barton Cole Cochran. R. 000014. The Subscription
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Agreement incorporated by reference a Private Placement Memorandum (the "PPM").
R. 000010.

The PPM fully disclosed to Boling the nature of the investment Boling was

making in Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, as well as the nature of the relationship between
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC and each counter-defendant (other than Rob Ruebel, who is
not mentioned in the PPM). See, e.g. R. 000086-89. The only connection between counterdefendant Rob Ruebel and Boling that appears in the record is that Mr. Ruebel's contact
information is included on a cover letter enclosing information related to the Clearwater 2008
Note Program, LLC that was sent to Boling. R. 000123.
On or about February 15, 2012, Boling filed a demand for arbitration against Clearwater
2008 Note Program, LLC and the counter-defendants. R. 000017-19. The counter-defendants
objected to the demand for arbitration and filed a petition to stay arbitration as to them, on the
grounds that they were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

R. 00005-00020.

In

response to the petition to stay arbitration, Boling filed an answer (R. 000022-000025) and,
under separate pleading, filed substantive counterclaims against the counter-defendants alleging
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (R. 000026-000223 ).

Counter-defendants

moved to dismiss Boling's substantive counterclaims on the grounds they were improperly filed
in response to a petition to stay arbitration. Boling strenuously urged the district court to allow
him to keep his counterclaims in place, representing in writing three times in his opposition to
the motion to stay arbitration that he would agree to the stay if he were allowed to pursue his
counterclaims:
However, had Boling attempted to compel arbitration with the
courts, which he does not intend to do if the Court allows Boling's
counterclaims to be prosecuted in this lawsuit, Boling would have
prevailed and plaintiffs would not be entitled to their costs and
possible attorney fees herein.
R. 000252-253 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 16-17) (emphasis original).
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If the Court allows Boling' s counterclaims to be prosecuted in this
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served
with the counterclaims and discovery is pending, then Defendant
Boling accept~ Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and decision not to
arbitrate claims against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Judicial
intervention in this lawsuit is Boling' s preferred method to resolve
his ICPA claims because 1) it allows Boling the right to judicial
discovery of information exclusively in Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants' possession, which is denied by arbitration, 2) none of
the proposed arbitrators have any experience in handling unique
ICPA claims or issues, and 3) for judicial economy, the
prosecution of the counterclaims is significantly advance at this
time.
R. 000253 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 17, n.3) (emphasis original).

Additionally, if the Couit allows Boling's counterclaims to be
prosecuted in this lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
have been served with the counterclaims and discovery is pending,
Boling, as the prevailing party, accepts Plaintiffs' objection to
arbitrate and decision not to arbitrate claims against
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants.
R. 000260 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 24) (emphasis original). The district

court granted the motion to stay arbitration and found that it had jurisdiction to allow Boling's
substantive counterclaims be prosecuted in that action.

R. 000278-79.

Counter-defendants

answered Boling's counterclaims. R. 000280-94. After having repeatedly advising the district
court that he would not seek arbitration if he were allowed to maintain his substantive
counterclaims, Boling changed his position and moved to compel the counter-defendants to
arbitration. R. 000507-540. After full briefing and hearing on the motion, the district court
denied Boling's motion to compel, stayed arbitration as to the counter-defendants, and certified
the decision as a final judgment. R. 000575-576. Boling timely appealed. R. 000578.

II.

RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

l. Under Idaho contract law, can a counter-defendant who is not a signatory to the
agreement containing the arbitration clause and who is not seeking any direct benefits
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arising from the agreement containing the arbitration clause be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute against his will?
2. Under Idaho law of judicial estoppel, does a party waive his right to compel arbitration
when he represents to a court that he will not oppose a petition to stay arbitration if the
court allows him to pursue substantive counterclaims and the court grants to him the
requested relief?
III.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Counter-defendants seek attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and
Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

IV.

ARGUMENT

The district court correctly denied Boling's motion to compel arbitration against the
counter-defendants and this Court should affirm that decision. The district court's decision was
correct because none of the counter-defendants signed the agreement containing the arbitration
provision and Boling failed to establish any theory under Idaho agency or contract law whereby
that agreement can be enforced against any of the counter-defendants.
Moreover, Boling expressly waived his right to seek an order compelling arbitration. By
informing the district court that he would not oppose the motion to stay if he was allowed to
pursue his substantive claims as counterclaims to the petition to stay arbitration. Thereafter,
Boling engaged in discovery substantially invoking the litigation machinery. After undertaking
these actions and gaining advantages which Boling admits would not have been available to him
in the arbitration context, Boling then changed course and sought an order compelling
arbitration. Boling should be judicially estopped from taking a position different than that which
he initially took in the litigation. And, because Boling has changed cours~ without a good faith
basis for doing so, Boling should be made to pay the counter-defendants' legal fees for pursuing
this frivolous appeal.
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A.

Boling cannot compel the non-signatory counter-defendants to arbitration.
By this appeal, Boling seeks an order compelling the non-signatory counter-defendants to

defend in arbitration claims that Boling has brought against them. Boling's demand to compel
these non-signatories into arbitration invokes the first portion of a two part test used to determine
whether a matter can be submitted to arbitration. Because Boling cannot satisfy the threshold of
this two part test, an order compelling arbitration would be improper.
When deciding a motion to compel or stay arbitration, a court must address two
questions: first, whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement and, if so,
whether the dispute at issue is subject to that arbitration agreement. Mason v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 n.1 (2007) (citing First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). Both portions of this test are questions of law
which are to be resolved by a court under state law contract principles. Id.
[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court
is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration
agreement nor its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in
issue. Where a party contests either or both matters, 'the court'
must resolve the disagreement.
Granite Rock Co. v. Int'! Bd Of Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857-58 (2010).

Arbitration

agreements are to be on the same footing as other contracts, but not more so. EEOC v. Waffl.e
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002). In this matter, it is undisputed that none of the
counter-defendants are parties to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. Because they
are not parties to that agreement, the arbitration clause contained within that agreement cannot be
enforced against them unless Boling establishes some other theory under ordinary principles of
state agency or contract law where the agreement could be enforced against them.
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Where a party seeks to enforce an arbitration provision against a person who is not a
party to the contract containing the arbitration provision, the enforcing party must establish that
some principle of state agency or contract law would otherwise allow the contract to be enforced
against that non-signatory.

Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631-32 (2009)

(abrogating any authority suggesting that there is a body of federal substantive law of arbitration
that governs whether non-parties can be compelled to arbitrate and making it clear that the issue
is to be resolved by state contract law). "'Traditional principles' of state law allow a contract to
be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through 'assumption, piercing the corporate
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and
estoppel.. .. "' Id. at 631.
Boling appears to acknowledge that, in order for any of the counter-defendants to be
compelled into arbitration, he must establish some theory under ordinary principles of agency or
contract law that would allow Boling to enforce the agreement against that particular person or
entity. Boling asks this Court to enforce the arbitration agreement on one of three separate
theories: agency, third-party beneficiary, and an "inextricably intertwined" version of estoppel.
App. Br. 28-29. However, under Idaho law and the facts of this case, none of these theories give
Boling the right to enforce the contract against any of the counter-defendants: The counterdefendants agency relationship with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC was fully disclosed;
none of the counter-defendants are properly characterized as third-party beneficiaries; and Idaho
law does not recognize the version of "inextricably intertwined" estoppel advanced by Boling.
For these reasons, Boling has failed to prove any theory under ordinary principles of agency or
contract law that would allow the agreement to be enforced against the non-signatory counterdefendants and this Court should affirm the decision denying his motion to compel arbitration.
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1.

An arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against an agent against his
will.

Black letter law regarding whether a contract can be enforced by or against an agent is
well settled, simple, and straightforward:
A person making a contract with another as an agent for a
disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract. A
principal is "disclosed" if, at the time of making the contract in
question, the other party to it has notice that the agent is acting for
a principal and of the principal's identity.

*

*

*

We conclude, consistent with well established agency principles,
that an agent by making a contract only on behalf of a disclosed
principal, whom he was power to bind, does not thereby become
liable for its non-performance.
One who makes a contract only on account of
another ordinarily does not himself contemplate
responsibility for its performance. His function is
performed if he causes a contract to be made
between his principal and the third person. He
guarantees neither the honesty nor the solvency of
the principal.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 696-697, 535 P.2d

664, 669-670 (1975) (citations omitted). It is undisputed that each of the counter-defendants'
relationship with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC was fully disclosed to Boling at the time
he entered into the subscription agreement.

Because each of the non-signatory counter-

defendants-to the extent they acted as an agent for Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC-acted
as a disclosed agent the arbitration clause contained within the subscription agreement cannot be
enforced against them.
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a.

Mutuality of Remedy does not support Boling's request to enforce an
arbitration clause against a non-signatory counter-defendant.

Because ordinary principles of agency law do not support Boling's premise, he asks this
Court to get more creative. He cites authority where a non-signatory agent was entitled to
enforce an arbitration agreement and then argues that the doctrine of mutuality of remedy
dictates that if a non-signatory agent can agree to arbitrate a dispute against a signatory, then a
signatory should also be able to force a non-signatory agent to arbitrate a dispute against his will.
App. Br. at 30. This argument runs directly counter to the fundamental principal of arbitration
law, which provides that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he has not
agreed to arbitrate; Boling has failed to present any authority that supports this proposition.
Boling's passing reference to mutuality of remedy as a legal basis to compel a
non-signatory agent into arbitration is not supported by adequate legal authority. }vfarcus &

Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v. Hock Inv. Co., the authority upon which Boling
relies, considers whether both parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause must be
bound to the arbitration clause in order for arbitration to be binding. 68 Cal. App. 4th 83, 91 fu. 6
(1998).

Under the facts of Hock, which involved a form real-estate purchase and sales

agreement, a California court held that both principals to the agreement were required to agree to
the arbitration clause in order for it to be binding against the principals. Id. Requiring mutuality
of remedy between the principals is materially different than requiring that a disclosed agent be
bound by the same agreement(s) that bind the principals. Boling has offered no authority to
support his invitation to this Court to make that curious leap.
In an additional effort to support his proposed twist on agency law, Boling presents a
footnote citation to the cases of Rowe v. Exline, 153 Cal. App.

4th

1276, 1285 (2007) and Harris

v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 475, 477-79 (1986) for the proposition that "a non-signatory
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who is the agent can even be compelled to arbitrate against his will." App. Br. at 30 n. l 0. While
Boling accurately represented Rowe's summation of Harris, Rowe's summation of Harris is
inaccurate.

In Harris the non-signatory doctor was compelled to arbitrate against his will

because he was found to be a third-party beneficiary of the specific arbitration clause at issue: to
wit, the arbitration clause specifically "requir[ed] arbitration of [patients]' claims against
'employees or other contracting health professional's' of [the medical group]." Harris, 188 Cal.
App. 3d at 479. 1 As additional support for its holding, the Harris Court further noted that the
intended third-party beneficiary had accepted benefits under the agreement containing the
arbitration clause. Id. The two facts critical to the Harris decision were (i) that the arbitration
clause specifically contemplated conferring arbitration as a benefit to an express class of thirdparty beneficiaries and (ii) the non-signatory doctor had accepted benefits under that agreement.
Rowe's suggestion that the non-signatory doctor was compelled to arbitrate against his will

simply because he was an employee/agent fails to fully appreciate the facts critical to the Harris
decision.
Those cases that have considered the logical consequence of mutuality of remedy as a
basis for compelling arbitration against a non-signatory have squarely rejected the idea. For
example, In re. Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007), which is the
authority cited by Boling for the proposition that an arbitration agreement can be enforced by a
non-signatory agent, has been distinguished on the converse proposition: i.e., a non-signatory
cannot be compelled to arbitrate against his will.
Elgohary, nonetheless, cites In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192
S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) and In re Merrill
Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
1

Accord Rath v. Managed Health Network, Inc., 123 Idaho 30, 30-31, 844 P.2d 12, 12 (1992) (holding that where
the arbitration provision specifically applied to only the parties to the agreement, the non-signatory third-party
beneficiaries could not be forced to arbitrate against their will).
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proceeding), for the proposition that agents and representatives of
parties to contracts containing arbitration clauses are also bound to
arbitrate. However, both Roe and DK Joint Venture distinguished
these cases, noting that in Roe and A1errill Lynch, the party
resisting arbitration was, in fact, a signatory to the contract and a
non-signatory was seeking to compel arbitration. See DK Joint
Venture, 649 F.3d at 315 (citing Roe, 318 S.W.2d at 520). "In re
Vesta stands for the proposition that a signatory plaintiff cannot
avoid its agreement to arbitrate dispute simply by bringing . . .
claims against the [nonsignatory] officers, agents, or affiliates of
the other signatory to the contract." Roe, 318 S.W.2d at 520. Both
Roe and DK Joint Venture hold that "it matters whether the party
resisting arbitration is a signatory or not." DK Venture, 649 F.3d at
317. If the party resisting arbitration is not a signatory to the
contract, his status as an agent of the signatory entity will not bind
him to the arbitration provision. Id.

Elgohary v. Herrera, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 2116, *12-13 (Tex. App. Mar. 5, 2013) (emphasis
added). The principal advanced by Elgohary is well reasoned and makes good sense. It is fair
and equitable to require that a signatory arbitrate disputes against a non-signatory disclosed agent
where the non-signatory disclosed agent has agreed to that forum. The same rationale does not
apply in the converse. It is not fair and equitable to force a non-signatory disclosed agent into
arbitration where the non-signatory disclosed agent has not agreed to it.
Under ordinary agency principals, the signatory's previous agreements by and between
himself and the principal cannot be superimposed on a disclosed agent. Because a court could
not re-write the contract to superimpose any other terms of the agreement on the disclosed agent,
it makes little sense to allow a court to superimpose an arbitration clause on the disclosed agent.
Arbitration agreements are to be on the same footing as other contracts, but not more so. EEOC

v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002).
Because mutuality of remedy does not provide a basis under principals of ordinary
agency law to enforce an agreement against a non-signatory disclosed agent, this Court should
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reject Boling's invitation to compel arbitration against the non-signatory counter-defendants on
such grounds.

b.

Casting his claims as statutory torts does not relieve Boling of first
showing that the agreement could be enforced against the nonsignatory agents.

As a final attempt to make his agency theory stick, Boling relies on Sunkist Soft Drinks,
Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 758 (1 lth Cir. 1993) for the proposition that, because

his claims against the counter-defendants sound in a statutory tort, he can enforce the arbitration
agreement against them without first demonstrating that the contract containing the arbitration
agreement applies to them. App. Br. at 32. On this point, Boling's logic is fundamentally
flawed as Boling relies on the part of Sunkist which discusses the scope of the arbitration
provision (which is still good law), and ignores that part of Sunkist that considers whether a
signatory is equitably estopped from denying a non-signatory's standing to enforce the
arbitration clause (which was abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Carlisle).
The part of Sunkist which is arguably relevant to the present appeal is whether Sunkist, a
signatory, was estopped from contesting counter-defendant/non-signatory Del Monte's efforts to
enforce the arbitration provision against Sunkist. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757. This speaks to the first
part of the two part inquiry that a court must make when determining whether to compel
arbitration.

Mason, 145 Idaho at 200, 177 P.3d at 947 n. l (two part inquiry involves (i)

determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate and (ii) whether dispute fits within the
scope of the arbitration clause) (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995)). Without making clear whether it was relying on ordinary principals of state contract
law, the Sunkist Court found that non-signatory Del-Monte could enforce the arbitration
agreement against signatory Sunkist. Id. Because it did not make it clear whether its decision
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was based on principles of state contract law, this portion of the decision was overruled by the
Supreme Court of the United States's decision in Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle:
However, the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Carlisle, which
postdates all of those decisions of this Court, clarifies that state law
governs that question, and to the extent any of our earlier decisions
indicate to the contrary, those indications are overruled or at least
undermined to the point of abrogation by Carlisle.
Lawson v. Life of the South Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011). Because the issue
before this Court is whether there is an arbitration agreement that Boling can enforce against the
non-signatory counter-defendants, the only portion of Sunkist which is even arguably relevant to
the issue before this Court is no longer good law.
The portion of Sunkist upon which Boling relies (App. Br. 32) speaks to the second
question to be answered by a court when deciding whether to compel arbitration: whether the
dispute at issue falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757-58
("Therefore, the focus of our inquiry should be on the nature of the underlying claims asserted by
Sunkist against Del Monte to determine whether those claims fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause contained in the license agreement."). This issue would not come before this
Court unless and until this Court first determined that Boling can compel non-signatory counterdefendants to arbitration.

Accordingly, Boling's reliance on Sunkist is misplaced, logically

flawed, and should be disregarded by this Court.

2.

Third-party beneficiary law does not provide a basis for compelling the nonsignatory counter-defendants to arbitration.
a. An arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against an alleged thirdparty beneficiary that is not seeking any benefits under the contract.

In addition to agency theories, Boling also argues that the arbitration agreement should be
enforced against the non-signatory counter-defendants because they are third-party beneficiaries
to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. App. Br. at 29 and 33-34. Assuming, for
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purposes of the present section only, that any of the counter-defendants could properly be
characterized as third-party beneficiaries of the subscription agreement, the arbitration clause
still cannot be enforced against them under ordinary principals of contract law because a thirdparty beneficiary must comply with the terms of the contract only where that third-party
beneficiary is attempting to recover benefits due to it under that contract.
A third-party beneficiary may enforce an arbitration agreement (Comer v. Micor, Inc.,
436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone
PoulencFiber & Resin Intermediates, 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001))), but a third-party

beneficiary "cannot be bound to a contract it did not sign or otherwise assent to." Id. at 1102
(emphasis original) (citing Motorsport Eng'g, Inc. v. Maserati SPA, 316 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.
2002) and Abraham Zion Corp. v. Lebow, 761 F.2d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 1985))). A third-party
beneficiary is found to have "otherwise assented" to an agreement when that third-party
beneficiary attempts to enforce his rights as a third-party beneficiary under the agreement. Lewis
v. CEDU Educational Servs., Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 143, 15 P.3d 1147, 1151 (2000); see also Bantz
v. Bongard, 124 Idaho 780, 785, 864 P.2d 618, 623 (1993) ("noting that an additional insured

[i.e., third-party beneficiary] must comply with the obligations of a policy in order to benefit
therefrom"). In this case, none of the counter-defendants are attempting to assert any rights
arising under the contract that contains the arbitration provision. Because the non-signatory
counter-defendants are not asserting any rights under the agreement, they have not "otherwise
assented" to the agreement, and they cannot be bound by such agreement.
b. Boling has not established any facts that would characterize any of the
counter-defendants as third-party beneficiaries.
The reason that the non-signatory counter-defendants are not asserting any rights under
the agreement is that they are not third-party beneficiaries of the portions of the agreement at
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issue in this case.

Under Idaho law, in order to establish that someone is a third-party

beneficiary, the at-issue provision in the agreement must expressly reflect the intent to benefit
the third-party. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687, 183 P.3d 771, 775 (2008).

"The third-

party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the thirdparty is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract." Id. (citations omitted). "The intent to
benefit the third-party must be expressed in the contract itself." Id. (citations omitted). An
"indirect reference to a third-party does not make the third-party a beneficiary of the [contract]."

Rajagopalan v. Noteworld, LLC, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10055, *7 (9th Cir. May 20, 2013)
(quoting Tooley v. Stevenson Co-Ply, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 626, 724 P.2d 368, 371 (Wash. 1986)
(applying Washington law regarding third-party beneficiaries)).
An express reference to a third-party beneficiary was found in the case of Harris v.

Superior Court, where the at-issue arbitration provision expressly identified employees as thirdparty beneficiaries in that the arbitration clause specifically "requir[ed] arbitration of [patients]'
claims against 'employees or other contracting health professional' s' of [the medical group]."

Harris, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 479.2 There is nothing so bold in the arbitration provision before this
Court today. Rather, the arbitration provision that Boling seeks to enforce against the nonsignatory counter-defendants does not make any direct or indirect reference to third-party
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the non-signatory counter-defendants are not properly characterized
as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement.
Boling's claims that the counter-defendants are third-party beneficiaries to the contract
rest on the same factual allegations that make them agents of the Clearwater 2008 Note Program,
LLC:

i.e., indirect references that describe how the funds raised by Clearwater 2008 Note

2

Accord Rath v. Managed Health Network, Inc., 123 Idaho 30, 30-31, 844 P.2d 12, 12 (1992) (holding that where
the arbitration provision specifically referenced the parties to the agreement, non-signatory third-party beneficiary
could not be forced to arbitrate agaL11st her will).
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Program, LLC will be managed and used. Specifically, Boling cites to a provision of the PPM
which establishes that certain persons and entities are paid: "The Company, the Manager and
their Affiliates are entitled to receive certain significant fees and other significant compensation,
payments, and reimbursements from the sale of the Notes." App. Br. at 33 n.13. Boling has not
claimed that he invested in the Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC with the specific intent of
providing benefits to the counter-defendants.Boling has not cited any authority for the
proposition that receiving management fees, salaries, or other reimbursements gives rise to thirdparty beneficiary status.
Boling also cites to the PPM which states that "Most, if not all, of the loans to be made
by the Company with the proceeds of this Offering will be made to Affiliates of the Company
and the Manager." App. Br. at 33 n.13. Boling has not claimed that he made the investment with
the intent to provide this type of benefit to the counter-defendants. Boling has not provided any
authority for the proposition that the recipient of loans made by the Clearwater 2008 Note
Program, LLC gives rise to third-party beneficiary status. Boling has also not provided any
evidence that any of the non-signatory counter-defendants ever received loans made by the
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC. Under Idaho law, the theoretic possibility that one or
more of the counter-defendants could have applied for and been given a loan from the
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC is insufficient to establish third-party beneficiary status.
As a final attempt to establish third-party beneficiary status, Boling notes that
counter-defendant RE Capital, LLC (which is currently in bankruptcy) is the guarantor of the
Notes. From that, Boling argues that RE Capital, LLC's members, counter-defendants Meyer
and Benak, are third-party beneficiaries. Boling cites no authority to support the proposition that
the guarantor of a Note is a third-party beneficiary of that Note, nor has he cited any authority for
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the more novel proposition that the owner/managers of a bankrupt guarantor are third-party
beneficiaries of the underlying obligation.
In sum, Boling has failed to establish that any of the counter-defendants were third-party
beneficiaries of the agreement. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's order
denying Boling's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that none of the non-signatory
counter-defendants are third-party beneficiaries.

3.

Ordinary principles of contract law do not support the inextricably
intertwined version of equitable estoppel advanced by Boling.

Boling's third basis for attempting to compel the non-signatory counter-defendants to
arbitration is that "counterdefendants' actionable conduct is inextricably interwoven with the
formation and performance of the entire agreement, making it equitable to compel the nonsignatory Counter defendants to also be bound by the arbitration clause in the entire agreement."
App. Br. at 29. Under ordinary principals of contract law, this is not a basis for enforcing a
contract against a non-signatory to that contract. Rather, this loosely defined and seldom used
theory grew up around the development of a "federal substantive law" of arbitration which was
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle.
Before it was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, the ill-defined concept
of "inextricably interwoven" conduct giving rise to enforcing an arbitration agreement against a
non-signatory counter-defendant was unsettled and met with healthy skepticism:
While the Fifth Circuit has recognized concerted-misconduct
estoppel, the theory is far from well-settled in the federal courts.
Despite hundreds of federal appeals involving arbitration, it
appears in only 10 reported opinions. In the two leading cases,
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C. and MS Dealer Service
Corp. V Franklin, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that both
direct-benefits and concerted-misconduct estoppel were present, so
it is unclear what the latter theory added to the result. Of the
remainder, the theory was found inapplicable in 4 and it was not
reached in 2 more. In only 2 cases did the result hinge on the
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exception-and in those the Firth Circuit compelled arbitration in
one and refused to do so in the other.

In Re. Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d at 192-93 (original emphasis omitted). The Texas
court went on to note "Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies whether concertedmisconduct estoppel correctly reflects federal law, or even whether federal or state law governs
the issue, today's decision must remain somewhat tentative."

Id. at 195.

In Carlisle, the

Supreme Court of the United States spoke on the issue and held that there is no federal
substantive law of arbitration and state contract law provides the correct rules of decision.

Carlisle, 556 U.S. at 631-32.
At the district court, the non-signatory counter-defendants set forth the elements of
equitable estoppel, as it applies under Idaho contract law, in support of their argument that they
cannot be compelled to arbitrate against their will. R.000552. Anticipating that argument on this
appeal, Boling argues that a different version of equitable estoppel applies when an arbitration
clause is at issue. App. Br. at 38. In support of Boling's request to use an arbitration specific
version of equitable estoppel, he claims that "In the context of Idaho arbitration law, equitable
estoppel 'precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously
attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes."'

App. Br. at 38 (citing General

Conference of the Evangelical Methodist Church v. New Heart Community Fellowship, Inc.,
2012 WL 2916013 at *5 (D. Idaho 2012)). Boling failed to apprise this Court of the source of
the authority upon which the Federal District Court relied in that opinion. Had he done so, this
Court would have been advised that the Federal District Court did not rely on Idaho law, but
rather relied on 5th Circuit law which was abrogated in Carlisle.
The following line of authority that Boling failed to explain or distinguish demonstrates
that the state law rules of decision, which were advanced by counter-defendants at the district
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court, is the proper framework pursuant to which this Court should consider Boling's equitable
estoppel claims. The New Heart case cited by Boling was quoting Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436,
F .3d l 098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) which, in turn, relied on a quote from Wash. Mut. Fin. Group.

LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267 (5th Cir. 2004). The opinion in Bailey made it clear that at the
time of the decision the Fifth Circuit was using federal substantive law of arbitration for its rules
of decision. Id. 267-68 and n.6.
Following the Carlisle decision, courts within the Fifth Circuit recognized that any
federal substantive law of arbitration had been abrogated. THI of NM at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v.

Patton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5252 at *17-*21 (D.N.M. January 3, 2012).

Noting that

"equitable estoppel" had to mean the same thing in the arbitration context as other contexts, the

Hobbs Court applied New Mexico law regarding equitable estoppel as it applies in the contract
setting. Id. at *29 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) ("A court may not,
then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that
agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements under state law."). After expressly noting that state law provided the appropriate
rules of decision, the Hobbs court quoted and used New Mexico's 3-part version of equitable
estoppel. Id. at *30 ("(1) the party to be estopped made a misleading representation by conduct;
(2) the party claiming estoppel had an honest and reasonable belief based on that conduct that the
party to be estopped would not assert a certain right under the contract or a defense thereto; and
(3) the party claiming estoppel acted in reliance on the conduct to its determent or prejudice.")
This version of equitable estoppel is substantially similar to that used in Idaho, which was
the version cited by counter-defendants at the district court.

Boling has not provided any

authority tending to demonstrate that Idaho law has ever adopted or applied the version of
equitable estopple upon which he asks this Court to decide this case. And, because it is improper
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to construe an arbitration agreement differently than a non-arbitration agreement, (see Perry, 482
U.S. at 492 n. 9), counter-defendants respectfully request that the version of equitable estoppel
applicable to contracts in general be applied in this case.
Boling cannot establish, under Idaho's version of equitable estoppel, that the arbitration
clause (or any other provision of the contract) can be enforced against the non-signatory
counter-defendants. In order to enforce a contract on the grounds of equitable estoppel, the party
claiming estoppel generally must show
[ l] a false representation or concealment of a material fact be made
with actual or constructive knowledge of the true state of facts;
[2] that the party to whom the false representation was made was
without knowledge or the means of acquiring knowledge of the real
facts; [3] that the false representation was made with the intent that
it be acted upon; and [4] that the party to whom it was made relied
on and acted upon it to his prejudice.
Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 468, 531 P.2d 227, 230 (1975)
(quoting Bjornstad v. Perry, 92 Idaho 402, 405, 443 P.2d 999, 1002 (1968)) (brackets added).
"All of the above factors are of equal importance and there can be no estoppel absent any of the
elements." Id. (citing Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233 (1928) and Alder v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 92 Idaho 506, 446 P.2d 628 (1968)). Boling has failed to present a cogent
argument applying Idaho law of equitable estoppel to the facts that he claims entitle him to
enforce the arbitration provision against the non-signatory counter defendants. Rather, Boling
relies on his allegations of the "incestuous operation of the individual corporate officers and their
web of interlocking business entities under the umbrella of the 'Clearwater' name" (App. Br. At
34) and an "inextricably intertwined" version of estoppel that developed under the federal
substantive law of arbitration (App. Br. At 29 and 38)-a body of law that has been rejected by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
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At the district court, counter-defendants argued that Boling could not satisfy the
requirements of Idaho's equitable estoppel law. The district court agreed. On this appeal,
Boling makes no effort to satisfy the requirements of Idaho's equitable estoppel law but,
instead-and in the face of very clear, contrary authority from the Supreme Court of the United
States, which authority has been recognized by several federal courts in overruling and/or
abrogating prior decisions that follow a body of arbitration specific contract law-Boling argues
only that ordinary principals of contract law do not apply and that special rules applicable only in
arbitration should be considered. App. Br. at 38. Boling's argument and legal authority miss the
mark and Boling has not provided to this Court any bases upon which it should reverse the
district court's decision.

4.

The presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply when determining
whether a party has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration.

Boling appears to acknowledge that, in order to compel the non-signatory counterdefendants into arbitration, he must establish the grounds to do so under ordinary principals of
contract or agency law. Because Boling is unable to do so, he asserts that any doubts regarding
the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. App. Br. 25-26.
However, the presumption in favor of arbitration applies only to the scope of an arbitration
agreement; it does not apply to the determination of whether an agreement can be enforced
against a non-signatory. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293-94 n.9 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v.
Bd. of Trustees ofLeland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).

The strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to
those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement, and a party
cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he has not agreed to
resolve by arbitration.
Westera, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 763 (quoting Buckner v. Tamarin, 98 Cal. App. 4th 140, 142

(citing Benasra v. Marciano, 92 Cal. App. 4th 987, 990 (2001)). Boling has failed to establish,
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under ordinary agency or contract principals, that the contract can be enforced against the nonsignatory counter-defendants.

Because this is the threshold question of arbitrability, the

presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply and this court should not "resolve any doubts"
in favor of compelling these non-signatory defendants to arbitration.
B.

Boling has waived his right and is otherwise judicially estopped from attempting to
compel arbitration.

Even if Boling could have established a right to compel the non-signatory counterdefendants to arbitration, he waived that right by making representations to the district court that
judicially estop him from asserting that right. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of
value or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his option have demanded and
insisted upon." Motor Carrier Operations v. IDAHO PUC, 83 Idaho 351, 357, 364 P.2d 167,
171 (1961) (quoting Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956)). "Judicial
estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a
second position that is incompatible with the first." Hoagland v. Ada County, 2013 Ida. LEXIS
154, *27 (Idaho May 16, 2013) (citing Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 94, 277 P.2d 561, 565
(1954)). "The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect 'the integrity of the judicial system,
by protecting the orderly administration of justice a.11d having regard for the dignity of the
judicial proceeding.'" Id. (citing A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 685, 116 P.3d 12, 16
(2005)). "It is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system." Id.
(also citing 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §186 (2012)).
In this matter, Boling has taken impermissibly inconsistent positions with the judicial
system.

At the time counter-defendants filed their petition to stay the arbitration, Boling

responded by filing substantive counterclaims. R.000026-000223. Counter-defendants objected
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to the substantive counterclaims on the grounds that they were improperly brought in response to
a petition to stay the arbitration. R.000002. In his opposition to the petition to stay arbitration,
Boling made the following representation to the District Court:
If the Court allows Boling's counterclaims to be prosecuted in this
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served
with the counterclaims and discovery is pending, then Defendant
Boling accepts Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and decision not to
arbitrate claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants. Judicial
intervention in this lawsuit is Boling's preferred method to resolve
his ICP A claims because 1) it allows Boling the right to judicial
discovery of information exclusively in Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants' possession, which is denied by arbitration, 2) none of
the proposed arbitrators have any experience in handling unique
ICPA claims or issues, and 3) for judicial economy, the
prosecution of the counterclaims is significantly advanced at this
time.

R.000253 (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). Boling re-iterated this position in the
conclusion: "Additionally, if the Court allows Boling's counterclaims to be prosecuted in this
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served with the counterclaims and
discovery is pending, Boling, as the prevailing party, accepts Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and
decision not to arbitrate claims against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants." R000260 (emphasis
omitted). The district court granted counter-claimants motion to stay arbitration and allowed
Boling to pursue his counter-claims. R.000278-279.

Because Boling expressly waived his

right to seek to compel arbitration if he was allowed to proceed with his counterclaims in the
district court, and because Boling gained the advantage of substantial discovery which, by
Boling's own admissions, would not have been available to him in arbitration, Boling should be
judicially estopped from taking a different, inconsistent position.

Accordingly, counter-

defendants respectfully request that this Court find that Boling is judicially estopped from
seeking to compel arbitration against them.
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C.

Counter-defendants are entitled to attorney's fees on this appeal.
The counter-defendants respectfully request attorney's fees under Idaho Code section 12-

121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, for their defense of Boling's frivolous appeal. Idaho Code
section 12-121 "permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the
court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation."

Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 245, 280 P.3d 740, 748 (2012) (citing

Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292-93, 127 P.3d 187, 195-96 (2005)). An appeal is

deemed to be frivolous when arguments are '"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior
decisions rendered by this Court." Grazer v. Jones, 294 P .3d 184, 197 (Idaho 2013 ). Attorney's
fees on appeal are proper when "the law is well settled and the appellant fails to make a showing
that the trial court misapplied the law." Navarrete v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 852, 949
P.2d 597, 600 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018, 829 P.2d 1361,
1367 (Ct. App. 1991). "Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as litigants
represented by an attorney and this Court has previously awarded attorney fees against a pro se
litigant that pursued an appeal frivolously." Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2013 Ida. LEXIS 159,
*27 (Idaho May 22, 2013) (citing Twin Falls Cnty, v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043,
1046 (2003).
Boling's motion to compel arbitration and continued pursuit of that motion on appeal are
frivolous because Boling expressly represented to the district court he preferred to resolve this
dispute in the judicial forum and, further, that if he was allowed to pursue his substantive
counterclaims in the district court, he would consent to counter-defendant's objection to
arbitration. He was granted the requested relief, substantially invoked the litigation machinery,
and then took a fundamentally inconsistent position. The district court then denied his motion to
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compel on the merits and in light of well settled authority out of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Rather than arguing a basis for distinguishing the authority of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Boling argued that such authority did not apply and supported his argument with
authority out of the Federal District Court, in and for the District of Idaho, which relied on
precedent from the Fifth Circuit that had been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in

Carlisle. Instead of fairly facing this adverse authority, Boling failed to even apprise this Court
of the source of the authority upon which he was relying by omitting the relevant citations.
Boling's appeal has been brought frivolously and the counter-defendants are entitled to
an award of attorney's fees for having to defend against the frivolous and unsupported appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, counter-defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm
the decision of the district court granting their motion to stay arbitration and denying Boling's
motion to compel arbitration, and award counter-defendants their reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in defending against this appeal.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2013.
RAINEY LAW OFFICE
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Attorneys Respondents
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